

# Discussion Slides: Alaska Senate Finance Committee

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
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#### Tax Credits Under ACES

| Credit   | Rate                  | Qualifying Expenditures   | Certificates Can Be<br>Submitted to State for Cash? |
|--|-----------------------|---|---|
| AS 43.55.023(a)<br>Qualified Capital Expenditures Credit   | 20%                   | Qualified Capital Expenditures (including exploration)  | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.023(b)<br>Carried-Forward Annual Loss Credit      | 25%                   | Excess Lease Expenditures (where Production Tax liability is insufficient to deduct costs)              | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.023(I)<br>Well Lease Expenditure Credit           | 40%                   | Well Lease Expenditures (Intangible Drilling Costs) below North Slope                                   | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.025(a)(1-4)<br>Alternative Credit for Exploration | 30%                   | Exploration expenditures for wells more than 3 miles outside an existing area (if outside Cook Inlet)   | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.025(a)(1-4)<br>Alternative Credit for Exploration | 40%                   | Exploration expenditures for wells more than 25 miles outside an existing area (10 miles in Cook Inlet) | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.025(a)(5)<br>Cook Inlet Jack Up Rig               | Up to<br>100%         | First 3 unaffiliated wells drilled by same jack-up rig in Cook Inlet                                    | Yes   |
| AS 43.55.019<br>Education Credit                           | Max<br>\$5<br>million | Cash donations to educational institutions  | No  |
| AS 43.55.023(i)<br>Transitional Investment Credit          | 20%                   | Expenses before March 31 2006 (pre-PPT)   | No  |
| AS 43.55.024(a)<br>Middle Earth Credit                     | \$6<br>million        | Production below North Slope and outside Cook Inlet (Expires 2016)                                      | No  |
| AS 43.55.024(c)<br>Small Producer Credit                   | \$12<br>million       | Producers with less than 50 mb/d average production (Expires 2016)                                      | No  |



#### **Total Impact of Credits**





## **Exploration Credits**




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#### Content

- Recent Trends in Exploration Activity and Basin Focus
- Credits and Incentives: Lessons from the Past
  - National Energy Program (Canada)
  - Norwegian Continental Shelf (Norway)
- Development Cycle Time: Incenting the Required Activities

#### **Rebound in Exploration Spending**



**Exploration Spend as % of Total Upstream Spend\*** 

\* Data reflects Total Consolidated Operations for BP, CVX, ExxonMobil (excludes purchase of XTO), TOTAL, Shell, Eni (1992-2011 only), Anadarko, Apache, BG, ConocoPhillips, Devon, Hess, Marathon, Repsol, and Talisman


Source: Upstream Competition Service




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### Trend in Worldwide Exploration: Global Players

- Exploration spending by many of the Global Players accelerated sharply in 2005-2006 as focus shifted to restocking the portfolio of development projects
- Statoil (North Sea) and Shell (Asia, North America) were early movers, quadrupling exploration spending since 2004
- The growth represents real activity gains, substantially outpacing the Exploration & Appraisal (E&A) Index






- Shell is the leader in undeveloped acreage holdings, at over 100 million sq.kms, in keeping with their "Last Land Grab" growth strategy.
  - Majority of acreage held by the Majors is in Asia and Africa; North America is material undeveloped acreage holding for Shell, XOM, and BP



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### Selected Global Players: Regions of Exploration Focus


- Setting aside the move by virtually all of the Global Players into the US/Canada onshore resource plays (oil sands, shale gas. Shale oil), the focus of exploration interest is in the deepwater plays of the Atlantic Basin
- Emerging interest in a return to the Arctic Resource play, led by Shell in the Chuckchi Sea, BP and Statoil in the Norway and Barents Deepwater, and ExxonMobil securing a strategic association with Rosneft in the Russia Arctic
- Of note is the near complete decline of the Middle East as a growth driver for these large companies





### Trend in International Exploration: Independents


- The International Independents are a more disparate group when it comes to exploration activity:
  - Some, like Anadarko, have been material exploration players through the last decade;
  - Some, like BG and Apache, have aggressively growth their exploration activities through the past decade;
  - Others, like Occidental and Noble, have focused on development activity in a small number of play areas
- Exploration spending by Anadarko, BG, and Apache has hovered around the \$1.3-1.5 bn mark for the last few years, high for the Indies and ~60% that of the smaller Global Players






### Selected International Players: Regions of Exploration Focus

- The Independents are similarly positioned in the US/Canada onshore resource plays (oil sands, shale gas. Shale oil), and the deepwater plays of the Atlantic Basin
- The Independents are also at the forefront of new basin development, such as the Equatorial Margin, East Africa Deepwater, South America "North Tier" deepwater play, Argentina shale gas, and Lake Albert basin (Uganda)
- The Independents are not as prominent in the high cost, high risk exploration opportunities in the Arctic offshore






#### IOC Growth Centered on Successful "New Frontiers"...



\* Includes: Anadarko, Apache, BG, BHP, BP, CNRL, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Devon, EnCana, Eni, ExxonMobil, Hess, Husky Oil, Marathon, Murphy, Nexen, Noble Energy, Oxy, Repsol, Santos, Shell, Suncor, Talisman, TOTAL, Woodside



#### ... Financed by Redirection of Free Cash Flow



2008-2010:

Along with Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa is now a key cash generating region for the Global Players—with surplus cash flow now supporting growth in North America

\* Includes data from the following companies: Anadarko, Apache, BG, BHP, BP, CNRL, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Devon, EnCana, Eni, ExxonMobil, Hess, Husky Oil, Marathon, Murphy, Nexen, Noble Energy, Oxy, Petrobras, Repsol YPF, Santos, Shell, Statoil, Suncor, Talisman, TOTAL, Woodside





#### Content

- Recent Trends in Exploration Activity and Basin Focus
- Credits and Incentives: Sharing Exploration Risk
  - National Energy Program (Canada)
  - Norwegian Continental Shelf (Norway)
- Development Cycle Time: Incenting the Required Activities

#### **Exploration and Government Risk Taking**

- By and large, Governments have refrained from engaging in the business of upstream risk
  - In emerging basins, nascent National Oil Companies (NOCs) will usually have "back-in provisions" within Poduction Sharing contracts, allowing entry into development projects as an equity participant at the point of sanction. Are prohibited from engaging in exploration activity
  - In more mature basins, the NOC may engage fully from license award to production (Petora in Norway, ONGC in India, PDVSA in Venezuela) assuming it has internalized the necessary degree of technical sophistication and dry-hole tolerance
- Exploration credits/rebates are, in essence, a direct engagement by the government in exploration risk. As such, they have been used sparingly outside of the context of the tax and royalty regime



# Canada's National Energy Program: An Experiment in Intervention Gone Awry

 The NEP was introduced to both enhance Canadian ownership in Upstream activities, and to accelerate the discovery and development of domestic resources to enhance security of supply and support energy subsidies to domestic consumers

| Jurisdiction  | Petroleum Incentive<br>Payments:<br>Exploration Activity  | Other Government Risk<br>Sharing   | Comments  |
|---------------|---|--|---|
| Alberta       | <ul> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;50%: 10%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;60%: 25%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;65%: 35%<br/>approved costs</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Development projects:</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt; 10%: 10%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;65%: 20%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Same applied to oil sands and<br/>EOR developments</li> </ul>       | <ul> <li>Incentives provided to<br/>both exploration and<br/>development activities</li> </ul>  |
| Federal Lands | <ul> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;50%: 35%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;60%: 65%<br/>approved costs</li> <li>Cdn Ownership &gt;65%: 80%<br/>approved costs</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>PetroCanada given 25% carried<br/>back-in option, convertible up to<br/>sanction decision. Paid by P-C<br/>share of production (grossed up<br/>by 15% per annum to reflect<br/>interest and inflation)</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Incentive exploratory<br/>well had to be &gt;3<br/>miles from a cased<br/>well, OR to a deeper<br/>horizon =&gt; incented<br/>deeper drilling in less<br/>prospective areas</li> <li>5 year Royalty holiday<br/>applied on production</li> </ul> |

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#### National Energy Program (Canada) and Exploration Incentives

- NEP introduced substantial distortions into the E&P decision making process. In particular, incented Upstream activity towards less prospective and higher cost areas, and introduced "artificial" demand for Upstream services
  - Drilling costs (seismic, rigs, etc.) accelerated rapidly as demand soared in new and unsupported exploration environments
  - Many companies were effectively "drilling for PIP grants" with commercial discoveries representing the Failure case

| Exploration Well<br>Costs | Canadian Arctic | Atlantic Offshore |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1966-1970                 | \$4.3 mm        | \$1.2 mm          |
| 1971-1975                 | \$3.6 mm        | \$3.8 mm          |
| 1976-1980                 | \$24.4 mm       | \$22.4 mm         |
| 1981-1985                 | \$63.2 mm       | \$45.8 mm         |
| 1986-1990                 | \$44.2 mm       | \$20.5 mm         |



#### Canada's National Energy Program:

- The decline in crude prices in the mid-1980s forced the withdrawal of virtually all aspects of the NEP
- Alberta:
  - PIP grants replaced by Royalty Tax Credits (75% rising to 90% with maximum credit per well)
  - Exploration Incentives restructured as either:
    - 12 month Royalty holiday on eligible wells to a maximum per well;
    - Royalty exemption on cumulative production, linked to well depth and location
    - Exploration Drilling Incentive Program: 50% credit set off against subsequent royalties
  - Moved away from credits/rebates outside of the royalty and tax environment => reward success, not simply effort.
- Federal:
  - PetroCanada back-in eliminated;
  - Royalty linked to "payout" of development
    - 1% royalty rising to 5% at rate of 1% per 18 months
    - Royalty jumps to 30% net CF after Payout
  - Exploration Tax Credit of 25% for well costs above \$5 mm, used to reduce Federal Income Tax. If not taxable => direct refund of up to 40% of non-utilized credit



#### Norwegian Continental Shelf: Incentives in a Modern Context

- Oil production in Norway peaked in 2001 and has fallen by ~45% since then. Growth in gas production allowed BOE volumes to rise till 2004, and have been in decline ever since
- Fiscal system provides incentives for exploration activity


| Initiative                |        | Comment  |
|---------------------------|--------|--|
| Base Production<br>Tax    | • 25%  | Applied to net income from Petroleum activities  |
| Special Tax               | • 50%  | <ul> <li>Applied to net income geenrated from petroleum activities, to capture<br/>resource rent above "normal profits"</li> </ul>   |
| Government<br>Investment  | Petoro | <ul> <li>Engages in exploration and development activity as full equity partner;<br/>pays share of costs and receives 100% of revenue from its working<br/>interest position</li> </ul>  |
| Exploration<br>Incentives | • 78%  | <ul> <li>Applies to companies in non-taxable position. Since government allows uplift of loss carry-forward at a risk-free interest rate, it is indifferent between refund or offset</li> <li>Introduced to expand the competitor landscape, bringing in new Upstream companies</li> </ul> |
| License access            |        | <ul> <li>All companies require pre-approval for financial, technical, and<br/>operating capability prior to bidding on a License in the Norwegian<br/>Continental Shelf (NCS)</li> </ul>   |



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
#### Cycle Time to Production



**Tool and Target: Direct Incentives to the Desired Outcome** 

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
### High Levels of Exploration Support under ACES



After Tax Effective Government Exploration Contribution With 40% Credit




# Reduced Levels of Exploration Support under Progressive Severance Option



After Tax Effective Government Exploration Contribution With 40% Credit



#### Levels of Exploration Support under Progressive Severance Option with 20% Exploration Credit



After Tax Effective Government Exploration Contribution With 20% Credit




## **Capital Credits**




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#### Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under ACES at \$50 Oil






#### Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under ACES at \$100 Oil











#### Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under ACES at \$200 Oil




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# Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under Severance Option 1 at \$50 Oil






# Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under Severance Option 1 at \$100 Oil





# Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under Severance Option 1 at \$150 Oil





# Capital Credit – Return on Investment Under Severance Option 1 at \$200 Oil

