# An Explorer's View of Gas Pipeline Issues


Alaska Division of Oil & Gas June 13, 2008



Alaska Department of Natural Resources

http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/

#### **Explorer's Decision Tree**



<sup>1</sup>Assumes land position already established and prospect is identified and ready to drill.

## Key Lessons From the Model


- Exploration is risky: big chance of big spend but no payoff
- Need big payoff from the success leg to pay for the large probability of failure
- If payoff from the success leg isn't sufficiently large, initial exploration never occurs

## How AGIA Boosts the Success Leg Payoff

- Lower base tariffs (75/25 debt/equity ratio) increase netbacks
- Lower tariffs through Rolled-in rates also increase netbacks
- Expeditious and predictable timeline, from first spend to first gas, raises *discounted* value of eventual gas sales

#### **Tariff Provisions**


Effect of Rolled-in vs. Incremental EMV Benefits of AGIA versus FERC Open-Season Rules\*



\*Expected monetary value (EMV) of a generic North Slope stand-alone gas prospect; 75/25 D/E capital structure for base tariffs, 60/40 for expansions; \$8.00 AECO gas price, flat, real

#### **Tariff Provisions**

#### Effect of Rolled-in, 75/25 D/E vs. Incremental, 50/50 D/E EMV Benefits of AGIA versus FERC Open-Season Rules\*




\*Expected monetary value (EMV) of a generic North Slope standalone gas prospect; \$8.00 AECO gas price, flat, real

## Critical Results on Access Delays

- Up-front investment for seismic acquisition, exploration drilling, and delineation drilling really hurts the economics of oil and gas projects that risk being delayed for many years
- 2. Every year of delay in access to a gas pipeline after money has already been invested materially reduces the expected monetary value (EMV) of projects


#### How Discounting Works

Present Value of \$100 Cash Flow in Future Years Sensitivity to Discount Rate



#### **Prospect Economics\***

Effect of Delay: AGIA vs. FERC Open-Season Rules



\*Expected monetary value (EMV) of a generic North Slope stand-alone gas prospect 6/12/2008

#### End (Appendix Follows. For full model details see AGIA Finding, Appendix L)

# The Exploration Model Base Case Assumptions

- 1. 10% discount rate for operator (5% for SOA)
- 2. Land is already leased over attractive prospect
- 3. Seismic data is already owned over prospect
- 4. Prospect is sanctioned for exploration drilling
- 5. 1<sup>st</sup> exploration well cost = \$38 MM\* in Year 1 of the project
- 6. 2 well delineation program cost = \$25 MM\* each in Year 2 and Year 3 of the project
- 7. Pad and facilities construction begins in Year 4, cost is scaled to production
- 8. Pipeline construction begins in Year 5, cost is scaled to production
- 9. Base Case (no delay) = 1<sup>st</sup> gas sale in Year 8, 6 years after delineation drilling

\*Undiscounted expense in today's dollars, before any tax credits or incentives

#### **Defined Variables**

- 1. Gas price = \$8.00/Mcf\*
- 2. OpEx = scaled based on annual production rate

\*Fixed value or rate for every year of the model


## **Drilling Success Probabilities**

- 40% = Probability 1<sup>st</sup> exploration well finds gas (geologic success)
- 2. 60% = Probability delineation drilling program is success

## Development Scenario Probabilities

- 1. High reserves case = 1,800 BCF (5% probability <u>after</u> delineation)
- 2. Medium reserves case = 800 BCF (15% probability<u>after</u> delineation)
- 3. Low reserves case = 400 BCF (75% probability  $\underline{after}$  delineation)
- 4. Uneconomic reserves case = 80 BCF (5% probability *after* delineation)

#### Base Case Expenditure Profiles for Facilities and Drilling



Note: Baseline production is assumed to begin in Year 8 after one year of development drilling.