Capital Allocation and Global Portfolio Review:
Testimony to the Alaska Senate Resources Committee

February 6, 2013
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PFC Energy
Part 1:
Oil & Gas Company Decision Making: Capital Allocation, Budget, and Long-Range Planning

Points to Address: Discussion of Company Behaviors and Decision Making
• Key considerations for companies in making investment decisions, including decisions on whether to develop particular resources in the near term or postpone development
• Key metrics including ROCE, NPV, IRR, consideration of asset metrics versus portfolio metrics

Part 2:
Global Strategy & Portfolio Overview of Major Alaska Producers: BP, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil
Oil and gas companies follow a standardized process linking the annual Budget cycle to the Long Range Plan and corporate Strategy.
Strategy, Planning and Positioning

Future of the World: Planning Scenarios

- Global Economic Performance
- Energy Supply/Demand Balances
- Geopolitical Considerations

External Planning Environment: Identifying key uncertainties and forcing factors that will impact company Strategy and Long Run Planning

Preferred Operating Regions and Basins

Above ground risk, Potential “No Go” Geography

Blockers, Enablers, Gaps, Logjams; Determine materiality “Size of the Prize”

Identify Filters for Option Selection

Strategic Options: Robust across scenarios, Consistent with Objectives and Filters

Atlantic Basin: US GOM
- Atlantic Basins: Brazil
- Alaska North Slope
- UK North Sea
- Shale Gas Plays
- Other Basins: Africa, Asia

Above Ground Operating Environment

Market Outlook and New Source Activity

Competitor Landscape in Target Segments

IOC Targets, Objectives, and Filters
Annual Planning Cycle

Q1: Strategy Review and Update
- Annual strategy review, basin positioning, operating environment
- Long range plan update

Q2: Planning Approval, Execution Research
- Board Approval
- Special projects analysis, new business lines, research stemming from strategy review

Q3: Budget Preparation
- Corporate input to key planning variables; Business Units prepare capital & operating budgets
- Update 5-year plan

Q4: Budget Approval
- Budget roll-up and Corporate approval
- Board approval of budget
- Allocation of investment capital to approved projects
Planning Cycle and Capital Allocation

Corporate Input: Common Assumptions on External Environment

- Gulf of Mexico Business Unit
- UK North Sea Business Unit
- Alaska North Slope Business Unit
- Eagle Ford Shale Gas Business Unit
- Angola Deepwater Business Unit

Recycle as Required

Corporate Roll Up: Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Capex

Board Approval, Capital Allocation, Project Approval, Program Execution
Annual Planning Cycle

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Attracting Capital: The Project Approval Process

- Materiality, total capex exposure, full-cycle economics/metrics, are all considerations in determining whether an IOC will position, or continue to invest, in a particular asset or basin.
- Each project is disaggregated into “discrete investment decisions”, in the form of Project Approval Requests (PARs), creating a natural **stage-gate** for capital approval and allocation.
  - A PAR can extend beyond a single fiscal year budget, depending on scope of the work program. Represents **non-discretionary** capex at the start of the budget year
  - Each PAR has one or a series of associated **Approval for Expenditure (AFE)** documents for a specific activity or capex element
  - Sum of AFEs for a calendar year = **capital Budget**
- Each stage-gate creates an opportunity for Management/Board to determine whether to **continue**, **amend**, **suspend**, or **exit/divest**
Business Control Architecture:
PAR => AFE => Budget
Question: On what basis does an E&P company allocate investment capital to opportunities?

- There are a core set of metrics that allow comparison of projects and investments *within* a given basin/area, and *across* the portfolio of available investment opportunities.

- For example, an enhanced recovery project in Alaska will compete for capital against:
  - Capex investments in Alaska;
  - Enhanced recovery projects elsewhere in the portfolio;
  - Capex investments elsewhere in the portfolio.

- Capital programs must also compete against debt repayment, share buyback, and dividend policies.
Upstream Financial Metrics: Measuring Performance

- **Growth**. Ability to manage the “top line”
  - CAGR in Production and Reserves relative to target
  - Quality of growth. Where, how, consistent or not (room to run)
  - Plowback Rate. Showing relative growth intentions between different regions

- **Profitability**. Ability to manage the “bottom line”
  - Upstream Cash Flows
  - Upstream Net Income
  - Upstream Production Costs

- **Efficiency**. Ability to manage capital
  - Upstream ROCE
  - Finding costs, F&D costs, Replacement Costs

- **Cash Flow**. Ability to manage investment/re-investment in the portfolio
  - Financial Strategy (debt targets, debt/capital ratio, dividend requirements)
  - Self-financing nature of portfolio (free cash flow versus capex: regional and global)

- **Risk**. Ability to manage a diversified portfolio
  - Financial Risk: Debt-to-Capital ratio, financial flexibility
  - New Source Risk: Thinner margin barrels dominating new source volumes
Energy companies employ a variety of Benchmarks or Metrics to rank investment opportunities and to allocate financial capital. Some of the more common include:

- **Pay-out period**: length of time required to recoup financial capital being placed at risk. Simplest selection metric, important to firms with scarce capital resources. No reference to project value after pay-out.

- **Internal Rate of Return**: discount rate at which PV of costs = PV of revenues.

- **Net Present Value**: PV of costs less PV of revenue flows (using discount rate reflecting cost of capital, cost of borrowing, or other);
  - NPV/boe: measure of investment efficiency
  - NPV/Investment (or PVPI): assessment of return to the investment dollar.

- **Recycle Ratio**: Profit per boe divided by F&D cost per boe. A measure of project or corporate profitability (target >1).

- **Discounted and Undiscounted Net Cash Flow Profiles**: measure of availability of free cash flow for follow on or alternative investments.

- **Maximum Negative Cash Flow Exposure**: useful in situations where access to financial capital is an issue. Measures the maximum exposure being committed to by the firm.

- **Net Booked Reserves**: contribution of the projects to corporate value (based on bookable reserves, amongst other measures).

- **Capex/boe**: cost per barrel of production capacity. Burdens the projects by the cost of infrastructure, facilities, etc. Tends to favor less complex, more mature capex alternatives.
A project will be “eligible” for budget capex allocation given it meets or exceeds absolute project metric requirements

- Example:
  - NPV10 > 0
  - PVPI > 1.3
  - Payback < 3 years

- NOTE: These metrics will change over the project cycle, as risks are addressed and estimates become more certain (e.g., 60:40 to 80:20)

However, the allocation decision is both specific to given project performance, and relative to alternative use of funds.

- To allocate scarce capital to competing uses, Corporate will establish “hurdle rates” on key performance metrics, such as IRR.
- Projects with an IRR in excess of the hurdle rate attract budget capital, while those below the hurdle rate are not funded.
- An increase in available investment capital (say, through an increase in crude prices) may be reflected in a lower hurdle, allowing more projects to be funded.
Portfolio Efficiency: Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)

- Efficiency in capital allocation and use over time is reflected in the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
- ROCE = \(\frac{(Net\ profit\ before\ interest\ and\ taxes)}{(Gross\ Capital\ employed)} \times 100\)
  - Where:
    - Gross capital employed = Fixed assets + Investments + Current assets \(OR\)
    - Gross capital employed = Share Capital + General & Capital Reserves + Long term loans
- The higher the return on capital employed, the more efficient the firm is in using its funds. Over time, ROCE reveals whether the profitability of the company is improving or eroding
- Generally speaking, larger E&P firms focus on ROCE, while smaller players focus on Growth

Global Players Average Upstream ROCE: 20.4%
Tier I Independents Average Upstream ROCE: 11.4%
Portfolio Efficiency: Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)

- **Issues with ROCE:**
  - Major capital project investments increase the denominator in advance of revenue (profit) impacts in the numerator => *penalizes the IOC for major capital investment undertakings*
    - Explains in part why it is unusual to find companies with high ROCE and high growth metrics
  - Once commissioned, the scale of major capital project investments tend to deliver superior ROCE performance => *bias toward large asset portfolios*
    - Exception is deepwater developments, where high, short plateaus and steep production declines can result in highly volatile ROCE outcomes
  - Depreciation creates *bias in favor of mature portfolio*: More mature the asset base, the lower the denominator (capital exposed) and the higher the ROCE (all else being equal)
Part 2:
Global Strategy & Portfolio Overview of Major Alaska Producers
- BP
- ConocoPhillips
- ExxonMobil

Points to Address: Discussion of Portfolio Composition and Growth/Capex Focus
- Where are these companies looking to grow. Which plays and basins are attracting investment capex
- What is the position and role of Alaska within these portfolios
BP: Company Overview

Strategic Signature

- Global integrated company; production in 23 countries, upstream operations in an additional 6 countries.
- 2011 worldwide production of ~3,400 mboe/d, making it the second largest company in the peer group (after ExxonMobil with ~4,513 mboe/d).
  - The Russia & Central Asia (RCA) and North America regions = ~55% of 2011 production.
- Post-Macondo portfolio rationalization program (~$28 bn in asset sales and ~$17 bn in GOM production allocation to Macondo fund) completed in 2013. The result is a pared down and more focused geographic portfolio.
- Executing on a 3-pronged growth strategy:
  - Deepwater Basins: US GOM, Angola, Egypt, Brazil
  - Global Gas: US, Trinidad & Tobago, North Sea
  - Giant Oil Fields: Alaska, Iraq, others.
- Committed ~$20 bn net investment to 16 projects sanctioned over 2010-2011. Will curb ROCE performance for the coming 2-3 years.
- Sale of TNK-BP (~$22 bn proceeds) => ~1 mmboe/d production decline in 2013 from 2012. BP will be hard pressed to outperform its peers on any key metrics.

Company Overview

- HQ: London
- Employees: 83,400
- 2011 Reserves: 17,750 mmbboe
- 2011 Production: 3,400 mboe/d
- 3 Yr Production Growth: -3.53% CAGR (2009-2011)

- Jan 2013 Market Cap: $141 bn
- Jan 2013 P/E Ratio: 8
- 2011 Corp Revenue: $375 bn
- 2011 Upstream Capex: $17 bn

Technological Competence

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<tr>
<th>EOR &amp; Recovery</th>
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Partnership History

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### BP: Global Areas of Upstream Operations

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In 2011, BP was the second largest producer of the peer group. BP and COP are the only two companies forecast to deliver production declines over the 2010-2015 period.

**2001-2011:** Production increases from ~3,080 mboe/d to ~3,400 mboe/d due to addition of Russia (~960 mboe/d), Trinidad & Tobago (~250 mboe/d) and Angola (~170 mboe/d). This expansion offsets declines from Europe (-660 mboe/d and North America -350 mboe/d), and portfolio divestitures.

**2012-2016:** BP was forecast to show modest production gains over the period. The sale of its stake in TNK-BP lowers this outlook by ~1 mmboe/d, a volume that would be offset (with improved upside) should the 19.74% equity positioning in Rosneft be concluded.
BP: Regional Trajectories

Asia-Pacific: ~246 mboe/d in 2011, centered on LNG feedstock. Expanding deepwater exploration acreage and a growing exposure to CBM. Reliance partnership in India offshore coinciding with divestiture of Pakistan and Vietnam portfolios.


Latin America: ~561 mboe/d in 2011 (~34% of global gas volumes). Sale of assets in Colombia, reduced exposure in Venezuela (sold to TNK-BP); shift in regional strategy to South Atlantic deepwater exploration and development (Brazil, Uruguay).

Middle East & North Africa: ~410 mboe/d in 2011, a decade high. Large development portfolio (Iraq, Oman, Egypt deepwater) challenged by above ground issues.

North America: ~764 mboe/d in 2011, 2nd largest production region, focused on Deepwater GOM. Sale of conventional oil and gas assets in Onshore L48, growing focus on shale gas and oil sands development (first oil from the in-situ (SAGD) Sunrise project expected in 2014).

Russia & Central Asia: ~1,099 mboe/d in 2011; dominated by TNK-BP in Russia (divested 2013). Leave Azerbaijan as the sole source of medium-term volume growth, pending Rosneft equity deal.

Sub-Saharan Africa: ~123 mboe/d in 2011, sourced from Angola deepwater. New source volumes from a suite of multi-field deepwater development projects. Positioned to test the pre-salt analog in the Kwanza basin in Angola and further south in Namibia.
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<th>Alaska Designation</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>PFC Energy Assessment</th>
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| Harvest Area      | • Asset concentration on the **North Slope**, where production volumes have generally declined because of the maturity of the asset base and/or gas infrastructure constraints. Liquid production has declined from ~224 mboe/d in 2006 to ~153 mboe/d in 2011, while gas production has fallen from ~67 mmcf/d to ~22 mmcf/d over the same period.  
• BP’s largest source of production is the **Greater Prudhoe Area** (26% w.i., operated), covering ~150,000 acres with more than 1,000 active wells. Gas resources are currently stranded. BP and ConocoPhillips withdrew the 4 bcf/d Denali pipeline proposal (Prudhoe Bay => western Canada => US markets) in May 2011, citing the lack of long-term purchase contracts.  
• In March 2012 ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips and BP settled litigation with the Alaskan government over the development of Point Thomson gas reserves, publicly announcing their interest in gas commercialization and export opportunities from Alaska  
• BP and partners are moving forward with the development of gas liquids on the ~8 tcf **Point Thomson** field (32% w.i., non-operator). The gas cycling project is expected to produce ~10 mb/d of liquids; first production is targeted for 2014. Full field development awaits gas transport infrastructure.  
• In the **Beaufort Sea**, BP has suspended work on the extended-reach drilling program on the **Liberty** oil field (100% w.i.), pending revision of project design and schedule.  
• BP is also seeking to develop viscous (**Kuparuk**) and heavy (**Milne**) oil resources on the North Slope.                                                                 | Current production volumes are modest and declining. Significant potential lies in the long-term commercialization of Prudhoe Bay and Point Thomson gas resources. Cancellation of the Denali gas pipeline proposal leaves BP as a potential supplier to an alternative pipeline/LNG export option, should one be approved and developed. |
PFC-Identified Challenges

- **Bring a close to the portfolio rationalization process:** With ~$16 bn in upstream asset divestitures announced since June 2010 and another $17 bn in royalty over-rides redirected to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Reparation Fund, BP indicated in 2Q:2012 a further ~$12 bn in total portfolio asset sales before end-2013 – excluding the net ~$22 bn from the TNK-BP sale. The portfolio repositioning represents an exchange of secure production and proved reserves for higher-risk, less certain, but potentially more material future growth opportunities (Krishna-Godavari basin offshore India, Kwanza pre-salt analog offshore Angola, Equatorial Margin analog offshore northern Brazil).

- **Secure a new Core Area:** With positioning in both Russia and the UAE in question, BP faces the prospect of a diminished number of Core areas capable of delivering material, sustained production and free cash flow. This places significant pressure on the transitioning of Focus areas into larger, stable Core operations in order to remain above the targeted 2.4 mmboe/d production floor (ex-TNK-BP volumes). BP is betting heavily on the potential of nascent deepwater plays in the South Atlantic and Asia-Pacific – a strategy that will hinge on exploration success and performance of newly established and uncertain partnerships.

- **Execute the exit from TNK-BP JV and Repositioning in Russia:** Russia production tied to TNK-BP accounted for ~29% of BP’s global production in 2011 (and ~25% of total production since 2004), and the second largest source of free cash flow after the US. BP will look to secure a position in Russia’s emerging Arctic Resource play through equity positioning (19.74%) in Rosneft – a move with greater upside than TNK-BP, but markedly less control.

- **Develop deepwater partnership with Petrobras:** Having secured Brazil government approval for its acquisition of the Devon asset portfolio (potentially the largest operated pre-salt portfolio outside Petrobras), BP has moved to deepen its ties with the Brazil NOC, farming into Petrobras operated licenses in the pre-salt analog basin areas offshore Angola and Namibia. Subsequent partnering in the Brazil Equatorial Margin suggests a budding deepwater strategic alliance between the two premier deepwater developers, with the prospects of substantial, long term rewards.

- **Accelerate development of US Onshore unconventional gas resource:** BP received a very competitive price for the Permian Basin and Western Canada conventional gas assets sold to Apache (totaling ~75 mboe/d of production and ~340 mmboe of reserves, equivalent to ~$24.60/boe of reserves in the ground or ~$109,000/flowing boe of production). This is particularly so given what is shaping up to be an extended period of gas price weakness in the North America market. To make up for lost volumes, BP may look to accelerate production from its ~10 tcf of reserves in the Woodford, Fayetteville, Haynesville, and Eagle Ford shale gas plays.

- **Accelerate development of BP’s oil sands leases:** BP has built up a material oil sands lease portfolio in Western Canada, including 50% w.i. in the Sunrise in situ development project (sanctioned in November 2010), a 75% w.i. in the Terre de Grace in situ project (secured in March 2010 from Value Creation for ~$900 mn), and 50% w.i. in the Kirby in situ oil sands leases (with the other 50% divested to Devon in March 2010). Full development of these projects could represent 500-600 mbo/d of stable, long-life oil production, complementing the “Giant Oil Fields” growth platform and providing a portfolio buffer against the steep decline production profiles associated with deepwater developments.
ConocoPhillips: Company Overview

Strategic Signature

- March 2010: new strategic pathway => ~$15 bn asset and joint venture divestment program, targeting:
  - Debt reduction;
  - Near-term shareholder returns;
  - Shift out of downstream; and
  - Growth from smaller, higher-value portfolio position.
- 2010-2012 Restructuring Plan:
  - ~$7 bn in asset sales
  - Divested i20% equity interest in LUKOIL
  - Pceeds to debt reduction and share repurchase.
- July 2011: Announces restructuring into two separate corporate entities, Downstream (Phillips 66) and a pure play, E&P company (ConocoPhillips).
- Net impact:
  - Production decline to ~1.5 mmboe/d in 2012, recovering to 1.64-1.69 mmboe/d by 2015.
  - Portfolio focus in OECD countries (US, Canada, Australia, UK, and Norway, which accounted for ~75% of worldwide production in 2011).
- Grow 0.5% per annum from 2012 through 2015 from Global Gas/LNG, SAGD Oil Sands, and Unconventional Resource developments.

Company Overview

- HQ: Houston, TX
- Employees: ~16,000
- 2011 Reserves: 8,387 mmboe
- 2011 Production: 1,610 mboe/d
- 3 Yr Production Growth: -30.68% CAGR (2008-2011)
- Jan 2013 Market Cap: $74 bn
- Jan 2013 P/E Ratio: 7.5
- 2011 Corp Revenue: $235 bn
- 2011 Upstream Capex: $13.5 bn

Technological Competence

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### ConocoPhillips: Global Areas of Upstream Operations

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
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</table>

**Grand Total**: 1,610

- Core
- Exit/Potential Exit
- Focus
- Harvest
- New Venture
Total Portfolio Evolution: ConocoPhillips vis-à-vis the Competition

Tier I International Independents Production 2001, 2011 and 2016 (PFC Forecast)

- The Tier I peer group is comprised of Independents with portfolios capable of delivering ~1 mmboe/d of production over the next 5-7 years.
- ConocoPhillips joined the Tier I peer group following its de-integration. Will see production continue to slide (floor in 2013), before recovering to slightly above 2011 levels by 2016.
- Production increases over 2001-2011 driven by:
  - the merger of Conoco and Phillips in the beginning of the decade (growing volumes from 698 mboe/d in 2000 to 1,082 mboe/d in 2002);
  - the Burlington Resources purchase in 2006 (growing volumes from 1,824 mboe/d in 2005 to 2,358 mboe/d in 2006); and
  - the gradual acquisition of a 20% stake in LUKOIL later in the decade.
ConocoPhillips: Regional Trajectories

**Asia-Pacific:** ~247 mboe/d in 2011. Core area of operations and future growth. Commissioning of APLNG will add long-term volumes, offsetting decline from conventional shallow water assets.

**Europe:** ~279 mboe/d in 2011. Mature asset portfolio with satellite field development slated to offset base declines and maintain free cash flows from this Harvest region.

**Latin America:** 0 mboe/d in 2011. Position secured through Burlington transaction. Not material to global operations.

**Middle East & North Africa:** ~106 mboe/d in 2011. Legacy oil positions in Libya and Algeria augmented by commissioning of Qatargas III LNG project => long-life, cash generating production to the region.

**North America:** ~903 mboe/d in 2011 (~56% of global volumes). New Ventures in Oil Sands, Unconventional Onshore resource plays, and GOM deepwater will provide regional growth.

**Russia & Central Asia:** ~29 mboe/d in 2011. Following sale of LUKOIL equity stake, production is sourced entirely from the Polar Lights and NMNG joint ventures in Russia. New Source volumes come from Kazakhstan's Kashagan development.

**Sub-Saharan Africa:** ~45 mboe/d in 2011; sourced from legacy assets in Nigeria, which are likely to be divested by mid-2013.
ConocoPhillips in North America—Alaska Cook Inlet

ConocoPhillips’ Interests in the Cook Inlet (Alaska)

Beluga River Unit

North Cook Inlet Area

Cook Inlet Area

ConocoPhillips’ Interests
- ConocoPhillips Operated
- ConocoPhillips Non-Operated
### Alaska Designation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>PFC Energy Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy portfolio acquired from Arco Alaska in 2000; includes the Greater Prudhoe Area (largest production), Greater Prudhoe Bay Area, Greater Kuparuk Area, Western North Slope, and Cook Inlet Area.</td>
<td>Alaska’s largest oil and gas producer. While continuing to target smaller projects within the GKA (West Sak and Ugnu) and NPR-A (Alpine West, Greater Moose’s Tooth unit and Fiord West), ConocoPhillips will ultimately need expanded access to Asia gas markets in order to reverse the downward production trend in Alaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production from the mature Alaska portfolio has been in slow decline since the late 1980s. In 2011, net production from Alaska averaged 215 mb/d of oil and 61 mmcf/d of gas, accounting for ~35% of US production.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity in the ConocoPhillips-operated Greater Kuparuk Area (GKA), has recently focused on development of viscous oil resources. The GKA, located 40 miles west of Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope, includes the Kuparuk field and its satellites: West Sak, Tarn, Tabasco, Meltwater, and Palm. Heavy oil resources West Sak and Ugnu (52.2% w.i., operated) are potential projects currently in the appraisal phase. Expected gross peak production is ~23 mboe/d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While ConocoPhillips has three primary gas fields in the Alaska region—the North Cook Inlet, Beluga River, and Point Thomson—Point Thomson (5% w.i., non-operated) remains the only potential new source development. In 2010, development activities continued with the drilling of two appraisal wells. First production of gas liquids is anticipated in 2015-2016. Longer-term growth potential lies in commercialization of the gas reserves, which is in turn dependent on construction of a long-distance gas trunk line.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Alaska Designation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>PFC Energy Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Core Area | • In the Western North Slope, ConocoPhillips faces regulatory challenges surrounding project development in the NPR-A region. In order to offset declines at the Alpine field (78% w.i., operated) and its three satellites, Nanuq, Fiord, and Qannik, ConocoPhillips is exploring development of additional satellite fields in the adjacent NPR-A, an area that requires distinct permit approval. Alpine West (or CD-5), a proposed Alpine satellite project, has been significantly delayed due to local opposition and regulatory barriers. Most recently, in early 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit for a bridge that would provide access to the CD-5 site, a move that will further delay the project (originally planned for 2012) and several additional developments that would depend on the infrastructure. Other possible projects on the NPR-A include the Greater Moose’s Tooth unit and Fiord West, which are both in appraisal phases.  
• In 2010, ConocoPhillips and Statoil engaged in an asset swap wherein ConocoPhillips sold a 25% w.i. in 50 of its Chukchi Sea leases to Statoil in exchange for financial payment and a 50% w.i. interest in 16 Statoil-operated Gulf of Mexico leases, as well as Statoil’s 25% w.i. in five additional GOM leases already operated by ConocoPhillips. All of the involved GOM blocks are in the emerging Lower Tertiary play. ConocoPhillips plans to begin exploratory drilling on its Chukchi acreage in 2014. |
- **Competing as a “Pure Play” E&P Company**: Repositioned as the largest Independent E&P company by a considerable margin. In the near-term, COP is a smaller company with limited near-term production growth and improved, but unlikely to be leading, ROCE and financial performance.
  - Has the company simply re-introduced its prior dilemma—too large to compete with the smaller International Independents on volume growth, and too small to compete effectively with the Global Players on efficiency metrics? Or can the company successfully deliver both volume and value/efficiency performance form its high-graded, down-sized asset portfolio?

- **Effectively Positioning in High Value Assets**: Sale of low margin, non-core (and largely non-OECD) assets => loss of optionality and diversity within its portfolio that can act as a hedge against commodity cycles and changing market conditions over the long term. Targeting of low risk (OECD) and high margin assets (such as US unconventional oil plays) raises the risk of destroying value by overpaying for competitive assets.

- **Defining Operational Strengths**: Strong partnerships => majority of growth will come from non-operated and/or JV related activity with specialized developers – FCCL JV with Cenovus in the Canadian Oil Sands; Australia Pacific LNG JV with Origin Energy; non-operated assets in the US GOM; Shell in the Malaysia deepwater. Also building considerable expertise in unconventional resource exploitation (both shale gas and tight oil) in the US Onshore.
  - Successful leveraging to unconventional resource plays outside North America could deliver the differentiating competitive advantage and volume growth required for ConocoPhillips to compete effectively within the Independent E&P peer group over the long term.

- **Effectively Managing Base Production**: Minimizing the decline in production from the company’s base portfolio—which has a high proportion of gas production exposed to continued weak North American gas prices—is essential for the company to deliver simultaneous production and margin growth.

- **Delivering Production Growth**: Production has fallen by 30% since 2009 (2,286 mboe/d to 1,610 mboe/d in 2011). New source developments basically keep pace with mature asset declines in the MENA, Europe, and RCA regions => material net growth must come from **North America and Asia Pacific**. US Onshore unconventional liquids plays are currently projected to deliver ~22% of total worldwide new source volumes in 2021.
ExxonMobil: Company Overview

**Strategic Signature**

- Largest of the Global Players
  - ~4,513 mboe/d in 2011; production in 21 countries, with upstream operations in an additional 20 countries.
- Growth strategy based on scale, basin dominance, and execution excellence => continuously seek access to investment opportunities of adequate size and materiality.
- Move into unconventional resource plays was a default for ExxonMobil:
  i. Commissioning of the final elements of the company’s Qatar project portfolio in 2011
  ii. Declining production from its Europe and Asia-Pacific portfolios
  iii. Roadblocks to materiality in Brazil deepwater, Venezuela extra-heavy, and Equatorial Margin
  iv. Already holding a considerable stake in the Canadian oil sands, ExxonMobil took an aggressive move into unconventional shale gas exploitation.
- 2009 acquisition of XTO Energy brings materiality to ExxonMobil’s technical expertise in tight gas, CBM, and shale oil and gas exploitation (~2.3 bcf/d and 87 mboe/d of production, proved reserves of ~2.3 bn boe, resource base of 7.5 bn boe).
- Leveraging XTO into a global unconventional portfolio.

**Company Overview**

- **HQ:** Irving, Texas
- **Employees:** 83,600
- **2011 Reserves:** 24,922 mmboe
- **2011 Production:** 4,513 mboe/d
- **3 Yr Production Growth:** 4.53% CAGR (2008-2011)
- **Jan 2013 Market Cap:** $415 bn
- **Jan 2013 P/E Ratio:** 9.6
- **2011 Corp Revenue:** $486 bn
- **2011 Upstream Capex:** ~$28 bn

**Technological Competence**

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<tr>
<th>EOR &amp; Recovery</th>
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<th>Heavy Oil</th>
<th>Unconventionals</th>
<th>Oil Sands</th>
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**Partnership History**

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<th>Region (or Country)</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<td>Rosneft</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Offshore Oil &amp; Gas</td>
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</tbody>
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*ExxonMobil has a limited history of partnership, preferring instead to purchase and operate material positions independently.*
# ExxonMobil: Global Areas of Upstream Operations

## Designation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011 Total (mboe/d)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>4,513</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Averaging ~4.5 mmboe/d in 2011, ExxonMobil continues to lead its peer group in terms of production.

**2001-2011:** Production oscillated through the decade, landing in 2009 at roughly the same level as 2001 (~4.0 mmboe/d), before rising 13% in 2010 (~6% excluding the XTO acquisition) to ~4.45 mmboe/d. The XTO acquisition marked a considerable departure from ExxonMobil’s longstanding organic growth strategy.

**2011-2016:** Modest volume growth, reaching ~4.69 mmboe/d in 2016. While PFC Energy estimates are lower than ExxonMobil targets, the absence of guidance regarding growth projects associated with the XTO portfolio makes the pace of future growth uncertain.
ExxonMobil: Regional Trajectories

Asia-Pacific: ~256 mboe/d in 2011. Focus on strengthening gas position in the region, to offset rapidly declining oil production base. Several MT/LT gas export projects including Gorgon and PNG LNG.

Europe: ~845 mboe/d in 2011. Mature asset decline and accelerating divestiture program have eroded region production from 1,393 mboe/d in 2001. New source volumes not expected to reverse this downward trend.

Latin America: ~8 mboe/d in 2011. Sole new source production is forecast from Argentina’s Neuquen Basin, where ExxonMobil is a relatively early entrant to the unconventional shale gas play.

Middle East & North Africa: ~1,277 mboe/d in 2011. Growth over the last decade driven by LNG projects in Qatar (stalled by ongoing moratorium on North Field development). Large legacy position in the UAE, a challenged upstream position in southern Iraq, and new exploration in Kurdistan.

North America: ~1,389 mboe/d in 2011. Expanded positioning in the US Onshore shale gas plays, material deepwater US GOM portfolio, development projects in the Canadian Oil Sands combine to deliver material production growth over the long term.

Russia & Central Asia: ~229 mboe/d in 2011. Growth from a small portfolio of large-scale assets, most of which face above ground challenges. Project execution on unsanctioned development queue remains critical.

### Alaska Designation | Activity | PFC Energy Assessment
--- | --- | ---
Harvest Area | • In Alaska, ExxonMobil holds interests in the Greater Prudhoe, Greater Point McIntyre, and Greater Kuparuk areas. The company is one of the largest North Slope producers, although production from the region is declining; 2010 net production averaged 114 mb/d of liquids.  
• Development activities continued at Point Thomson in 2010 (35% w.i., operated), and first production of gas liquids is anticipated in 2015-2016. Longer-term potential lies in commercialization of the gas reserves, which is dependent on building a gas pipeline and accessing export markets. | Material harvest position. As the largest holder of discovered gas resources on the North Slope and a co-operator of the Prudhoe Bay Western Region development, ExxonMobil holds a leading position in Alaska. Maintaining and growing upstream investment increasingly hinges on a gas commercialization/Export scheme. |
PFC-Identified Challenges

- **Adapting to the unconventional resource play business environment**: The XTO Energy acquisition and subsequent shale gas acreage transactions have made ExxonMobil a force in the North America unconventional resource play, shifting growth focus to a business model that is quite different from the large-scale, major capital projects that have driven core growth for the company over the last decade. With more than two-thirds of its unconventional resource acreage holdings (excluding the oil sands) positioned in gas plays, the company is clearly challenged by the ongoing weakness in natural gas realizations in North America. This is reflected in the company’s growing interest in US LNG exports—both from Alaska and the US Onshore. However, this is a long-term fix for a near-term challenge, and one with considerable arbitrage risk in the form of firming Henry Hub gas prices over the latter half of the decade.

- **Delivering on a new growth strategy based on strategic partnerships and frontier exploration opportunities**. The development moratorium on the Qatar North Field has left ExxonMobil searching for new engines of growth. One response has been a shift in strategy towards strategic partnerships and frontier exploration – reflected in the Rosneft strategic agreement covering frontier exploration in the Russia Arctic.

- **Execution or rationalization of challenged reserves and/or developments positions**. These include:
  - Monetization of captured frontier gas resources in North America (Alaska North Slope, Mackenzie Delta);
  - Development of captured oil reserves in the Caspian region, plagued by delays, cost over-runs, and accelerating resource nationalism;
  - Delivering on the West Qurna I redevelopment project in Iraq, which remains challenged by export infrastructure constraints. The securing of six exploration licenses in the northern Kurdistan region is the latest signal of ExxonMobil’s concern over the ability of Iraq to evolve into a Core area for the company.

- **Maintain leadership in share buy-back and dividend performance**: ExxonMobil has been a clear peer group leader in returns to shareholders, distributing ~$29 bn through dividends and share buy-backs in 2011 and spending ~$109 bn on share repurchase over the 2007-2011 period. With the increased emphasis being placed on unconventional gas resources to deliver future volume growth, shareholders will be looking for ExxonMobil to continue its leading dividend and share buy-back performance, as the core differentiator from its faster growing (in volumetric terms) peer group companies.
## Questions & Discussion

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<tr>
<th>2011</th>
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<th>% Global</th>
<th>% Trend</th>
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<td>173 mboe/d</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
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<tr>
<td>XOM</td>
<td>117 mboe/d</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>🔻</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX
Impact of Changes in Fiscal Terms on Upstream Investment: Assessing Data from Alberta, Canada
Exploration Spending in Western Canada

- Alberta has historically accounted for the majority of exploration expenditures in western Canada.
- The less competitive fiscal terms introduced in Alberta in 2007—which eliminated royalty holidays on new wells—were accompanied by a sharp decrease in exploration activity in that province, and a reallocation of exploration spending to Saskatchewan and British Columbia (BC).
- In 2010, responding both to this competition and to reduced expenditures resulting from the 2008-2009 economic crisis, the Alberta Government approved a new fiscal framework, designed to “position Alberta as one of the most competitive North American destinations for energy investment.”
- Since then, exploration expenditures in Alberta have recovered from the crisis far more quickly than in other jurisdictions.

**Question:** Is the relationship between exploration spending and fiscal change causal, or merely correlative?
Historically, roughly one-third of exploration spending in Western Canada is accounted for by land lease sales—securing acreage rights for future drilling. Strength in land lease revenue is a signal of future drilling intentions, as acreage can only be held for a defined period without seismic and drilling activity before reverting to the government.

For both Saskatchewan and BC, the rise in land lease sales revenue in 2007 and, in particular, 2008 accounted for a significant share of the rise in overall exploration expenditures:
- Land lease spending over the 2000-2010 period accounted for ~31% of total exploration spending for Alberta, and a higher 36% for Saskatchewan and 44% for BC.
- In 2008, land lease spending accounted for ~66% of total exploration spending for BC and ~56% in Saskatchewan, while that number reached only 24% for Alberta (an improvement over the 17% recorded in 2007).

While a share of this land lease spending in Saskatchewan and BC can be ascribed to upstream players “voting with their feet” in order to send a signal to the Alberta Government regarding fiscal changes, it is also the case that:
- In BC, the 2007-2008 period marked a major positioning by the exploration & production sector in the emerging Horn River and Montney shale gas plays in the northeast area of the province;
- In Saskatchewan, 2008 marked a major positioning in the emerging Exhaw/Bakken play, being the northern extension of the Bakken light tight oil (shale oil) play in North Dakota.
Commodity Prices Drive Upstream Activity

• However, it has been movements in commodity prices—and in particular, the dramatic downward shift in natural gas prices—that has been the largest contributor to changes in upstream activity in Alberta over the past 5 years:
  – Apr 2006 – Dec 2007: Henry Hub gas price averaged $6.74/mmbtu (~$6.15/mmbtu at the AECO-C Alberta border pricing point)
  – July 2008: HH price reaches $11.70/mmbtu;
  – Dec 2008 – Apr 2012: HH price averages $3.98/mmbtu (and as low as $1.95/mmbtu Apr 2012), or ~$3.38/mmbtu at AECO-C.

• Oil-directed and gas-directed drilling have responded to these movements in commodity prices:
  – Gas-directed drilling has fallen in step with weak gas prices and increasing production
  – Oil-directed drilling (excluding the oil sands) has risen over the period to a decade high in 2011-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alberta Drilling Data</th>
<th>Oil-Directed Drilling</th>
<th>Gas-Directed Drilling</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2006-Mar 2007</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>11,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2008 – Mar 2009</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>6,895</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 2011 – Mar 2012</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>1,641</td>
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</table>
• There is no disputing that upstream E&P activity responds to changes in fiscal terms. All else being equal, E&P companies will allocate their upstream investment dollars to those opportunities most likely to deliver best on performance metrics (IRR, NPV, PVPI, ROCE).

• However, as seen in the case of Alberta/Western Canada, upstream E&P activity responds most to movements in commodity price.
  – In Western Canada in general, and Alberta specifically, the greatest impact on upstream activity levels has come from the sharp and continuing decline in natural gas prices
  – Exploration expenditures ramped up sharply in BC and Saskatchewan in 2007-2008, coincident with a shift in fiscal terms that lowered drilling incentives in Alberta.
  – This particularly ill-timed fiscal change coincided with the maturing of shale oil and shale gas development technologies in the US Onshore basins, which manifested in the large land lease expenditures directed to the Horn River/Montney shale gas plays in northeast BC and Exshaw/Bakken shale oil play in southern Saskatchewan.

• Alberta’s reduced fiscal burden meant that it was very well positioned to compete for investment when economic activity in the Canadian upstream sector improved.
  – This can particularly be seen by the dramatic shifts in land lease sales revenues in Alberta in recent years
  – The impact on actual drilling activity has been more muted, however, because of the adverse impact of low North American gas prices.
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